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Abstract
We sought to examine the potential differences between different types of risky
decisions. While some decisions are easily represented as choices between future
alternatives, other decisions may be better represented as the management of a personally
owned situation. Schneider (2003) created the risk management task, which manifested
these situated improvement decisions, and identified a unique pattern of risk preferences
when compared to the standard gambling paradigm. To determine what cognitive
processes might be differentially activated for each type of decisions so as to yield these
risk preference differences, we incrementally manipulated the gambling paradigm to
parse potentially influential elements of situational context from both risky choice and
risk management. The elements of context found to be influential were (a) making an
improvement of your situation rather than a choice within your situation, (b) integrating
information into a more compact display, and (c) limiting the visual salience of
consequence information. The implications of these results as they relate to current
formal models of decision making and subsequent investigations of decision context are
addressed. Future directions using a similar appreciation of individual perceptual and
cognitive processes when studying decision making are also discussed.

1

Choice, Management, and Modification: Situational Context in Risky Choice
Understanding and predicting how people deal with risks when making decisions
has been a primary component of numerous scientific disciplines, including economics,
psychology, anthropology, and cognitive science. Risky choice is one of the most
common approaches currently used in risky decision making research (Goldstein &
Hogarth, 1997). The primary methodological tool used when investigating risky choice is
the “gambling paradigm,” which involves a comparison and choice between alternative
risky lotteries or gambles.
In most cases, examples of the gambling paradigm involve a forced choice
between two outcome/probability pairs. An example of the gambling paradigm is
provided in Figure 1. Participants are offered a choice between these two options. Option
A offers a 50/50 chance of winning $50 or $250 while option B offers a 50/50 chance of
winning $100 or $200. Risk preferences are established by the experimenter based on
participant’s responses. All else equal, higher variance lotteries (Option A in this case)
are considered riskier because the available outcomes are further from the mean ($150 in
this case).

Figure 1. An example of the gambling paradigm.

CHOICE MANAGEMENT AND MODIFICATION

2

Decisions in the gambling paradigm format have served as foundations in popular
normative models of decision making related to expected utility theory, like Von
Neumann and Morgenstern’s (1944) axiomatic treatment of expected utility and Savage’s
(1954) subjective expected utility (SEU) theory. Additionally, the gambling paradigm has
been a popular tool in the measurement of risk preferences for subsequent descriptive
models of risky choice, such as prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
There are a variety of benefits in using the gambling paradigm as a
methodological tool in current and future research endeavors. First, as with all paradigms
that reach some measure of popularity, the gambling paradigm is highly tractable. New
findings can easily be tied into the existing body of research using this paradigm and its
exemplars. Another benefit of the gambling paradigm is its simplicity (Hastie & Dawes,
2001). Risks are represented as separate situations that can be contrasted with one
another, and “risk preference” can be inferred when one risky alternative is preferred to
another, all else equal.
However, a major contribution of behavioral research in decision making in the
last 50 years has been robust demonstrations that the way information is presented has a
profound influence on behavior. Not all decisions in life are gambles; to the extent that a
type of decision is incongruent with the gambling paradigm, the predictions and
conclusions in that domain are suspect. As a result, identifying the types of decisions or
aspects of real world decision environments that are incongruent with the gambling
paradigm is a compelling research endeavor.
The progenitor of this approach is arguably Herbert Simon (1955, 1956), who
suggested that the study of decision making should focus on different methodologies and
models to investigate a diverse set of environments. This is because the cognitive
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processes used to evaluate decisions may differ across decision contexts. Simon provides
a metaphor for decision making where "behavior is shaped by scissors whose two blades
are the structure of task environments and the computational capabilities of the decision
maker" (p. 7, 1986).
Lopes (1981) also criticized rational choice theory’s use of the gambling
paradigm as being too rigid in its expectations for people’s use of probability information
for separate outcomes in isolated choice examples. Lopes instead suggested that
situational motivations including goals and aspirations are influential in how people
experience and respond to risks (Lopes & Oden, 1999).
Klein and colleagues (Klein & Calderwood, 1991; Rasmussen et al., 1993;
Zsambok & Klein, 1997) challenged the focus on analytical processing common to risky
choice research. They instead emphasize the relationship between proficient decision
making and recognition-based processes, or cognitive processes that generate potential
actions from within a situated decision environment. This desire for added realism is not
well represented in traditional investigations of risky choice, which posit that decision
makers use analytical processes to consolidate and compare available information about
future events or consequences. In models of risky choice, high quality decision making
requires substantial reduction of real world contingencies into discrete choices using
computational formats that can be combined algebraically.
An alternative viewpoint posits a focus on the influence of a decision environment
on behavior. Decisions in the laboratory are provided as discrete choices with complete
information and may not generalize across different decision formats or content domains.
In many cases, decision makers find themselves in less circumscribed, less complete
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situations and may be required to use recognition-based and possibly other processes to
decide how to move forward.
There are a variety of possible contextual elements present in real world situations
that are unexplored by popular theories which rely exclusively on the gambling
paradigm. These atypical real world situations have been investigated to some extent by
naturalistic decision making (Klein, 2008). This research primarily focuses on the
constrained, situated, and personally-relevant contexts found in decisions made about
specific content domains such as medicine (Elstein et al., 1978), aviation (Simpson,
2001), or law (Pennington & Hastie, 1988). However, this approach is limited by a
difficulty in operationalizing concepts like risk across domains (Lipshitz et al., 2001) and
difficulty in allowing for quantitative comparisons with existing research that uses the
standard gambling paradigm (Connolly & Koput, 2002).
From a methodological perspective, it would be ideal if it were possible to test
various contextual elements like those explored in naturalistic decision making via
systematic changes to the gambling paradigm. While a laboratory decision task may
never completely capture a real world situation, a subset of situational context from the
real world can be represented as comparisons between laboratory manipulations to the
standard gambling paradigm. This systematic approach would provide for new insights in
understanding the unique contributions of potential real-world contextual elements while
simultaneously retaining enough similarity with the gambling paradigm to allow for
quantitative comparisons to existing literature in risky choice.
The purpose of this dissertation is to explore some fundamental features that are
likely to vary across decision contexts, but to incorporate them into tasks that are
sufficiently similar to the gambling paradigm to allow comparisons with mainstream
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findings popular in both economic and psychological theories of risky decision making.
This will be accomplished through a series of systematic variations to the gambling
paradigm meant to capture four basic features of decision environments that are likely to
differ across various real-world decision contexts. These features include: (a) the visual
or perceptual separation or integration of decision options, (b) whether consequence
information is available either explicitly or implicitly, (c) how the decision relates to the
current status quo, specifically whether the current status quo already includes the risky
prospect (i.e., whether the risky prospect is endowed), and (d) whether evaluation focuses
on pre-existing options or potential actions.
Background: The Risk Management Task
The approach for the dissertation follows from the recent introduction of the risk
management task by Schneider (2003). Schneider was concerned that while many
decisions in the real world are made as choices between available options, other decisions
are made within an ongoing and situated context. She posited that in certain situations,
people may be more apt to see themselves as managing risks rather than selecting
between risky prospects. Schneider introduced the risk management task, which
incorporated a situated decision that can be improved by increasing or decreasing risk.
In the risk management task, participants are given a single gamble, but they are
provided with an opportunity to improve one of the two possible outcomes in the gamble
before playing it. Thus, the decision is characterized as managing an existing risk by
changing the situation for the better in one of two possible ways.
Methodologically, the risk management task is especially attractive because the
two possible improvements in the risk management task can alternatively be
characterized as two possible choice alternatives from a gambling paradigm task. In this
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way, one can make direct comparisons between the risk management and risky choice
tasks for each pair of potential options.
Figure 2 presents the version of the risky choice task used by Schneider (2003) to
represent the gambling paradigm. In the risky choice task, participants are asked to select
between two, two-outcome gambles of equal expected value that differ in riskiness of
each gamble. Each gamble is posed as a lottery, and each lottery is provided in a separate
display. The outcomes from each gamble appear as tickets along a number line in each
box. Participants are told that the outcomes in a given lottery are equiprobable.
Participants indicate which lottery they would prefer to play by selecting the “Lottery 1”
or “Lottery 2” radial button located below the respective lottery. Participants are also
informed that the hypothetical lottery would be resolved by placing the two tickets from
the chosen lottery into a hat and randomly drawing one of the two tickets and receiving
the amount indicated.

Figure 2. An example of a decision stimulus from the risky choice task in Schneider
(2003). Participants are asked to select which of the two lotteries they prefer by selecting
the radial button located below that lottery.
By contrast, the risk management task proposed by Schneider (2003)
conceptualizes risky decisions as a situation in which participants manage their exposure
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to risk. Figure 3 provides an example of the risk management task that corresponds to the
risky choice example above. Participants are told they are about to play the given lottery.
However, they are then given an opportunity to improve one of the possible outcomes in
that lottery before it is played. Participants can improve one of the two outcomes by
clicking on a ticket to move it to the next best position on the number line.

Figure 3. An example of a decision stimulus from the risk management task (Schneider,
2003). The arrows are included here to illustrate the possible ticket moves, and were not
actually presented to participants.
For instance, a participant could choose to improve the $50 ticket by clicking on it
so that it moves to the $100 position and then takes on the $100 value. So by clicking on
the lowest ticket, the participant would create a lottery with $100 and $200 tickets, or
clicking on the higher ticket, the participant would create a lottery with $50 and $250
tickets. In this way, the improvement of a ticket yields one of two possible lottery
scenarios.
Both the risky choice and risk management tasks from Schneider (2003) used
different procedural mechanism to address what is otherwise the same simple forcedchoice decision; two alternatives, with differing amounts of risk, were contrasted with
one another. Figure 4 demonstrates how stimuli from these two tasks use the same
economic information. In the risky choice task, the decision is organized into two
alternatives as their own separate probabilistic events. In the risk management task, the
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decision is organized into a single probabilistic event that can be actively improved into
one of the same two events presented separately in the risky choice task.

Figure 4. A demonstration of the way in which the two possible improvements in the risk
management task correspond to the two possible choices in the risky choice task.
Decisions made in the context of an active improvement in the risk management
task elicit a substantially different pattern of preferences than decisions made in the
context of a choice between risky alternatives in the risky choice task. In early studies of
the risk management task, Schneider and colleagues (2003; 2004; 2006) examined
monetary lotteries across a range of positive and negative expected values and across
lotteries that differed in risk level as defined by outcome variance. Figure 5 provides an
illustration pooled across multiple studies.
For the risky choice task, risk preferences largely conformed to patterns predicted
by the S-shaped value function of prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
Participants were more likely to choose the riskier option when lottery outcomes were
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negative and were more likely to choose the safer option when lottery outcomes were
positive. This pattern is highly reliable and has been demonstrated across hundreds of
studies of risky choice (Kuhberger, 1998; Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998).
However, for the risk management task, risk preferences tended to switch for
positive and negative valences. When the lottery outcomes were negative, participants
tended to be especially cautious, decreasing the amount of risk by routinely improving
the worse ticket thereby reducing risk. When outcomes involved gains, participants were
more open to taking risks when facing situations with increasingly large outcomes. This
was demonstrated by a tendency to improve the better ticket thereby increasing the
riskiness of the lottery. In some instances there was a difference in risk preferences
between the two tasks of as much as 30% -- just based on a relatively subtle change in
how decisions were presented.

Figure 5. Risk preferences for the risky choice task and the risk management task for
lotteries with a positive or negative valence at a range of expected values (indicated by
the number of “-“s and “+”s).
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The striking task-related differences in preferences that have been observed
between the two paradigms are highly reliable. The same task-related risk preference
patterns were found when participants were given actual payouts (Schneider, Hudspeth,
Decker, & Gagnon, 2006). In addition, the same pattern of responding was exhibited by
dyads who worked together to establish preferences (Mukherjee & Schneider, 2007).
Moreover, Schneider and Hudspeth (2005) have replicated the pattern of risk preferences
in the content domain of health outcomes. Given this reliability, these task-related
differences illustrate how a theoretically-important change in decision presentation can
produce vastly different patterns of risk preferences. Schneider and colleagues argue that
the risk management task allows participants to think about risks using the current state
as a reference point. This contrasts with the presentation of decisions as a selection from
passive and isolated choice alternatives. While the risky choice task and risk management
task both extract out essential elements of real decisions, the risk management task
extracts out different elements than the risky choice task. Some decisions in the real
world may be more easily interpreted as choices between available options, such as
choosing between brands in a department store, while there are certainly many other
examples of decisions in the real world that map more closely onto personalsituation/improvement decisions represented by the risk management task, such as
investment decisions (Lopes & Oden, 1999) or the content domains from naturalistic
decision making mentioned earlier.
From the Risk Management Task to Principles of Risky Decision Making
The risk management task is a compelling example of behavioral changes that can
be revealed by altering the traditional decision paradigm to include situational context
consistent with a focus on the situated improvement of a given situation, rather than the
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choice comparison between alternative scenarios. Although the change in how decisions
were presented may seem relatively subtle, this manipulation reflects a theoreticallymeaningful concern for task environments yielding reliable differences in risk
preferences. Because our primary focus is on understanding how elements of situational
context combine to influence risky decision behavior, we plan to explore several possible
reasons for the difference between preferences in the risky choice and risk management
tasks.
Specifically, four features were selected as promising candidates for being
elements with a primary influence on risk preferences: display integration, consequence
salience, personal ownership and behavioral focus. The primary goal is to explore how
these elements influence risk preferences. In what follows, each of the four selected
elements of situational context will be explained, followed by a theoretical argument for
why it may be responsible for the differences in behavior between the risky choice and
risk management tasks.
Choice display format and integration. One of the simplest characteristics that
might potentially influence preferences is the way information is presented in a display.
In particular, one might be concerned about the visual ease or difficulty in identifying
possible decision criteria or deciphering the relationship between the possible choice
options. The issue of integration within choice displays deals specifically with the visual
consolidation of information about available options.
The risk management task (Schneider, 2003) uses a single visual display to
communicate the information about available options, so one might argue that it has a
more consolidated presentation format. This differs from the risky choice task
(Schneider, 2003) and most other instantiations of the gambling paradigm, which provide
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possible alternatives either as separate lotteries in separate displays or as descriptions of
distinctly separate “Plans” or “Alternatives” (Kuhberger, 1998). So, a gamble with two
options would use two different displays, one for each option. Thus, the risk management
task may lead to different preferences than the risky choice task because the decision
takes up less perceptual space.
It may be possible to better equate the presentation effects between the risky
choice and risk management tasks by combining the information from the two choice
options in the risky choice task into a single visual display. . There are two possible
rationales for how integrating choice information into a single display might influence
risk preferences. They will be discussed in turn.
Ease of processing information from integrated displays. First, some researchers
suggest that information integrated into a single display is simply easier to evaluate.
Cognitive models of learning and problem solving are designed to address the benefits of
different types of display formats. One of the avenues of this research is focused on the
potential benefits of integrated displays over separate displays of similar information
(Sweller, Ayres, & Kalyuga, 2011).
Tarmizi and Sweller (1988) investigated how well students could learn
information about geometry when information was displayed with text shown separately
from a visual diagram compared to when information was displayed with text as an
overlay in the diagram. They found that students presented with text and diagrams
simultaneously in a single display outperformed students who were presented with two
separate sources of information. Similar results were observed in a number of
experimental studies (Chandler & Sweller, 1992; Bobis, et al., 1993; Sweller et al., 1998).

CHOICE MANAGEMENT AND MODIFICATION

13

They argued that the physical integration of information reduced the need for
mental integration and reduced extraneous cognitive load (Cierniak, Scheiter, & Gerjets,
2009; Sweller, Ayres, & Kalyuga, 2011). This aspect of physical integration may
generalize to risky decision making stimuli. As a result, information about risky decisions
may be made easier to cognitively evaluate when the information is presented in an
integrated single display, rather than separate displays of each option in the choice set.
Different decision strategies for different display formats. Second, some
decision researchers have noted that aspects of the display promote qualitatively different
information processing strategies. One of the major distinctions among strategies is
whether processing focuses on evaluating alternatives or comparing choice attributes
(Payne & Bettman, 2004). The differences in these strategies may be influenced by
whether displays present information in an integrated or separated format.
In alternative-based decision strategies, probability and outcome information is
combined to yield a summary evaluation (e.g., utility) for each alternative, and then the
summary values are compared across alternatives to select the better option. Alternativebased decision strategies are predicted by utility theories popular in risky choice research
(Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993), such as expected utility theory (Von Neumann &
Morgenstern, 1944) and prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). In attribute-based
decision strategies, the decision process starts with a comparison across each of the
attributes that are shared by alternatives. The option that has a preponderance of better
values on what are judged to be the most important attributes is then selected. Attributebased decision strategies are usually focused on the effects of one or more attributes over
others, such as elimination-by-aspects (Tversky, 1972) and the priority heuristic
(Brandstätter et al., 2006).
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Research contrasting alternative-based strategies and attribute-based strategies has
examined the effects of different presentation formats on strategy selection. Bettman and
Kakkar (1977) investigated whether organizing information in different ways encourages
the use of a particular alternative- or attribute-based decision strategy. They found people
predominately selected a strategy that corresponded to the organization of information.
Alternative-based comparisons were encouraged by displays that provided information
about each choice alternative separately. Attribute-based comparisons were encouraged
by displays that provided information about each attribute separately. They found a wider
range of strategy selection when information about alternatives and attributes were
combined into a matrix display.
These results were extended by Jarvenpaa (1989, 1990) to the realm of graphical
display formats in decision support systems. Displays that provide an overt contrast
between alternatives or between attributes overwhelmingly show strategic behavior
consistent with the display format. This may be related to Wickens and Carswell’s (1995)
proximity compatibility principle, which suggests that display design facilitates cognitive
processing to the extent that the decision criteria that need to be compared are physically
close to one another.
Furthermore, the constructivist viewpoint in decision research (Fischhoff et al.,
1988; Payne et al., 1992; Slovic, 1995) provides 30 years of research demonstrating that
decision representations are a primary influence in the construction of preferences. It is
typically assumed that different contextual factors support the adoption of different
decision strategies, which in turn lead to the observed differences in preferences.
In terms of risk preferences, however, there is little or no evidence regarding the
link between alternative- versus attribute-based strategies and risk preferences (Payne,
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1982). The research has typically been focused on decision accuracy, showing that people
are more apt to choose dominated alternatives when attribute-based strategies are
adopted. It is not clear how preferences might differ when gambles of equal expected
value are presented.
Based on this literature, it seems that the standard risky choice task, which
presents alternatives separately, may encourage the use of alternative-based processing
strategies. Indeed, prospect theory, like other expectancy-based theories, posits that
choice processing involves an alternative-based strategy of combining an option’s
probability and subjective value characteristics into a summary evaluation. In practice,
however, Payne and Braunstein (1978) found a wide variety of individual differences in
strategy selection, even among simple binary (i.e., two-option) risky choices. Sometimes,
decision makers were apt to engage in attribute-based processing, comparing the
attributes of “amount to win”, “amount to lose”, “probability to win”, or “probability to
lose” across alternatives. Other types of hybrid strategies were also commonly employed.
Manipulation to address display integration. In this study, we modified the risky
choice task to integrate information from two gambles into a single combined display.
This will be done to address the potential differences in cognitive difficulty and strategy
selection given the integrated display format used in the risk management task. This
entails displaying outcomes from the two possible choice alternatives on the same
number line, thus making their attributes (i.e., better/worse values) easier to visually
compare across alternatives. This will make the risky choice task visually similar to the
risk management task without fundamentally changing the underlying behavioral
requirements of the risky choice task.
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If the separate displays used for the risky choice task are a driving factor in the
formation of risk preferences, then the risk preferences for the integrated risky choice
task should become more similar to risk preferences for the original risk management
task. In addition, choice reaction times will be examined to determine whether combining
information into an integrated display will enhance information processing speed relative
to the original risky choice task.
Additionally, the aforementioned learning behavior research suggests integrated
tasks require substantially less effort for students to learn and manipulate information. As
a result, risk preferences may be influenced by the differences in effort necessary to
evaluate the decision. To test the relative amount of effort required to make a decision,
time used to evaluate a decision will be used as a proxy for the effort needed by
participants to make a decision. We hypothesized that a task using separated displays
would require more effort than tasks using an integrated display, and so the task which
maintains a separated display (the original risky choice task) should take significantly
longer than tasks which maintain an integrated display (the other four tasks). This was
assessed as a manipulation check.
Consequence-related information in risky decision making. Consequence
information is the knowledge about the potential final outcomes of a decision. In the
standard conception of a gambling paradigm, complete information about all outcomes
and probabilities is provided to a participant when eliciting a risk preference (Hastie &
Dawes, 2001). The risky choice task provides this complete information in a similar
fashion to the gambling paradigm. However, the risk management task does not provide
explicit consequence information about at the outset of the decision (Schneider, 2003).
Instead, participants are provided with a single situation with two outcomes whereby only
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one of their two outcomes can be improved. The gamble a participant will play is only
made visually available after improving the value of one of the outcomes. This
effectively requires participants to make a decision before they can directly observe their
possible final outcomes for the risk management task.
The risk management task is meant to represent situations where visible
consequence information is not necessarily available before making a decision. Situations
without explicit consequences pose a significant problem for popular models of decision
making (Sen, 1994). This is because some form of explicit consequence information is
required to form utilities in expected utility theory (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944)
and other expectancy-based theories that rely on drawing a quantitative distinction
between decision alternatives, such as prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
While it may seem trivial when consequence information can be easily inferred in the risk
management task, a number of behavioral decision models, including prospect theory,
argue that the underlying process for making decisions is psychophysical. If explicit
consequence information is required for this process, and no explicit consequence
information exists, then the underlying psychophysical process requires either (a)
additional steps to impute this missing information or (b) an altogether different method
of information processing. The issue of “consequence salience” focuses on the
availability (or lack thereof) of explicit consequence information to a decision maker
before making a decision.
To decipher the potential effect of consequence salience in the risk management
task, we will include explicit consequence information about the impending choice as a
manipulation of the risk management task. If the presence of explicit consequence
information is fundamentally important for determining risky decision behavior, then risk

CHOICE MANAGEMENT AND MODIFICATION

18

preferences will be similar for the explicit-consequences manipulation of risk
management task and the risky choice task. Three possible reasons why consequence
salience might influence the formation of risk preferences will be discussed.
Imagined or hypothetical consequences. One reason why consequence salience
might influence risk preferences is the potential difference in the quality of information
from imagined or hypothetical outcomes when compared to explicitly-provided
outcomes. It may be the case that evaluating decisions with imagined consequences
would require more cognitive effort, hence making the decision more cognitively taxing.
In addition, imputed data may carry the burden of the potential that it less precise than
explicit consequence information, which may in turn influence risk preference formation.
The limitations of working memory were addressed earlier in the discussion of
Cognitive Load theory (Sweller, 1994). A decision maker would require working
memory to glean complete choice options from the incomplete decision scenario.
Because of this, additional cognitive faculties would be required to process decisions
where consequence information is incomplete. To that end, differences in the effort of
evaluation for different gambles have been shown to influence patterns of risk preference
behavior (Garabarino & Edell, 1997). This may provide an explanation for the
differences in risk preferences between the risk management and risky choice tasks.
It may also be the case that decision makers may de-emphasize or overlook
information about a decision that needs to be imagined. Slovic (1972) posits the
“concreteness principle,” whereby decision makers will tend to use only information that
is explicitly available and will typically use it only in the form in which it is displayed.
He goes on to argue that “information that has to be stored in memory, inferred from the
explicit display, or transformed tends to be discounted or ignored” (p. 9). To justify this,
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he points out several studies where underlying probability distributions seem to have little
influence over behavior when participants are provided easily comparable payoff
information (Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1968; Payne and Braunstein, 1971). The implication
from the concreteness principle is that decision makers in the risk management task may
not focus on specific consequences when making decisions because consequence
information was not explicitly provided. These decision makers would instead
presumably focus on comparisons between the available information about their current
situation.
Adaptive decision making: operating without consequences. Realistically,
people are not always presented with information about their future consequences. As a
result, tasks that display explicit consequence information may not reflect risky choice
information in a way that decision makers are used to. However, tasks which represent
consequence information without certitude may reflect more accurate representations of
real world decisions, and hence provide a more generalizable task to examine risk
preferences.
The adaptive decision making approach (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993;
Gigerenzer et al., 2001) suggests that there are cognitive mechanisms that draw out the
useful information from an environment to help guide the decision process (Todd &
Gigerenzer, 2001), even under novel circumstances and without relying on a decision
calculus on information about future consequences. When placed in a real-world risky
situation, there may be some difficulty in figuring out what is possible, what actions can
be taken, and what the consequences of each action might be.
The underlying assumption of adaptive decision making is that a decision can be
made from a course of action formed based on one’s understanding of the rules and
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constraints of an environment (like a mental model) without necessarily deriving all the
possible consequences. These mechanisms are defined as explicitly adaptive because (a)
the uncertainty in novel environments often makes direct derivations of consequences
impossible and (b) real-world decision environments are often changing, which further
limits the ostensive usefulness of a direct derivation of utilities (Todd & Gigerenzer,
2007).
One example of research that addresses a lack of consequence information when
making decisions is the gap in risk preferences between “decisions from experience” and
“decisions from description” (Hertwig & Erev, 2009). The impetus of this research is
that, in many real world situations, it doesn’t make sense to provide consequence
information. This research focuses on how decisions made by gleaning probabilities from
actually-experienced samples of outcomes differ strategically from decisions made when
probability-outcome pairs are provided as description choice options (Hertwig et al.,
2004). For the sake of this investigation, we will only provide outcome information in a
descriptive format and will seek to always include consequence information, so as not to
confuse the issue of consequence salience with outcome/probability salience.
Naturalistic decision making: deriving one’s own consequences. Naturalistic
decision making research suggests that individuals need to derive their own consequences
when making decisions in real-world. Naturalistic decision making researchers have
investigated situations which require decision makers to figure out their own choice
options from a provided scenario, and have concluded that providing explicit
consequence information will necessarily bias a decision maker’s behavior. This
approach argues that the decision making process is artificial for tasks that provide
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explicitly-stated consequences because these tasks do not include option generation,
which they view as an essential psychological component of making decisions.
Real world decisions often lack clearly delineated choice options. For example,
devising a plan to balance the national budget constitutes a decision situation that has a
variety of possible avenues for solutions, but as a situation it lacks a priori choice
options. Choice alternatives must be formulated by the policy maker before the risks can
be assessed and a final decision can be made. The wide variety of real world contexts
where explicit consequence information is not provided prompted naturalistic decision
making researchers to investigate for the potential biasing factor associated with giving
decision makers their options up front.
Naturalistic decision research has demonstrated that people have cognitive
strategies they can use to identify choice consequence information from their situation
(Klein, 2008). Research in this field has also shown that preferences are different for
decisions in instances where these strategies are activated to formulate choice alternatives
(Bouffard, 2002; Johnson & Raab, 2003; Gettys et al., 1987; Klein et al., 1995).
Following this argument, the presence of explicit consequences would encourage
the selection of existing choice alternatives similar to processes operating in the standard
risky choice context. Additionally, because the risk management task does not provide
explicit consequence information, decisions may activate a cognitive process responsible
for the formation of choice alternatives consistent with reports in naturalistic decision
research. With a difference in cognitive processing, there may also be comparable
differences in preferences.
Manipulation to address consequence salience. This study includes a
manipulation of the risk management task that provides explicit information about future
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consequences. If consequence salience influences the decision process, then the risk
preferences for the risk management task with explicit consequence information should
appear different from the risk preferences found using the original risk management task
without explicit consequences. If explicit consequences prime the same cognitive
processes used to make risky choices, then preferences will look similar to those for the
risky choice task.
Construal of situations as personally owned when making decisions. Personal
ownership is meant to represent the conditions provided to participants in the risk
management task that may engender a sense of ownership over the persistent situation
that requires improvement and the outcomes in said situation. As mentioned earlier, the
gambling paradigm provides risky decisions as a comparison of two alternatives that vary
in their overall riskiness. By contrast, alternatives to the gambling paradigm, such as
naturalistic decision making, generally provide tasks that require decision makers to
formulate their own possible actions from a situated and malleable situation (Brehmer,
1992; Klein, 2008). Like the standard gambling paradigm, the risky choice task provides
separate, fixed and isolated scenarios. Similarly to the paradigms found in naturalistic and
complex decision making, the risk management task provides a single malleable situation
that is described as the participants’ “current state.” We hope to discern the influence of
personal ownership or situated decision making on risk preferences.
Endowment and a sense of personal ownership. An avenue of research to
consider when addressing the influence of personal ownership on risky decision making
behavior is endowment (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991). Endowment is a
psychological phenomenon that deals with the propensity for individuals to overvalue
outcomes after ‘ownership’ is transferred to the individual. When asked to attribute
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values to outcomes, decision makers assign a larger value to objects that they have been
given than equivalent objects that they do not own. Furthermore, risk preferences formed
about gambles with endowed outcomes have been shown to differ drastically from risk
preferences formed about gambles without a manipulation of endowment (Kuhberger,
1998). A variety of investigations of framing effects have demonstrated that endowment
may influence people’s evaluations of gains and losses (Thaler, 1980), people’s
evaluation of losing owned items over gaining equivalent items (Tversky & Kahneman,
1991), and people’s willingness to sustain losses in lieu of forgoing an equivalent gain
(Johnson et al., 1993).
The risk management task provides instruction to participants that the provided
gamble and its outcomes are already in their possession. Participants are then instructed
that they are afforded an opportunity to improve the gamble. Endowment becomes an
issue of importance when the first instruction is considered to provoke a sense of
ownership over the outcomes within that given situation. An interpretation using
endowment would then posit that the subsequent improvement is made to “one of their
outcomes”. By contrast, the risky choice task, which instructs participants to select one of
two possible situations, would potentially not provoke the same sense of ownership over
the outcomes within the decision environment, and would not hence involve issues
dealing with endowment.
Alternative interpretations of personal ownership. Popular opinion among
rational choice theorists contends that endowment is a bias inherent in human judgment
(Horowitz & McConnell, 2002, for a review). This interpretation of endowment suggests
that information about the owned nature of outcomes should be removed from
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manipulations of risky choice, as it is considered an extraneous variable when studying
the larger behavioral processes involved in risky decision-making.
However, it seems plausible that endowment manipulations show unique effects
because decision makers are being asked to evaluate a more personally meaningful
situation. Almost all decisions made in the real world share encompass a situated and
meaningful personal attachment. It therefore seems unacceptable to dismiss endowment
as a bias of human judgment without first investigating decision environments which
differ from the standard choice paradigm using tasks that represent real world situations
where personal ownership over outcomes might be anticipated.
Situated gambles, while providing a sense of personal ownership, also put a
gamble into the context of having a current and future state. This information may
provide additional tacit information about the context of a decision. Research on
reference points suggests that people’s evaluations of objects are sensitive to the current
and future states of those objects.
For example, McKenzie and Nelson (2003) found that people tended to describe a
cup as “half full” if the cup was being filled and “half empty” if the cup was being
emptied. Moreover, people were more apt to infer the previous state of “empty” or “full”
based on the description of the current state. This suggests decision makers are sensitive
to the historical information about outcomes when evaluating situated decisions.
In this study, information that stems from the situated nature of a decision in the
risk management task may be influencing risky decision behavior. Tacit information
about the gamble “as it is” may provide insight into the relationship between choice
alternatives by providing information about the previous relative position of outcomes
prior to eliciting a preference. The outcomes are not provided as a singular, current
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situation in the risky choice task context and, as a result, may not reflect the historical
information about a decision that is present in the risk management task.
Manipulation of personal ownership. A new task is required to incorporate the
ownership of a situation and its outcomes into a risky choice context. This task consists
of a gamble with four outcomes in pairs similar to the risky choice task. Participants are
afforded an opportunity to make a modification to the gamble by selecting which of the
two pairs of outcomes they want to remain in the gamble before it would be played. This
risk modification task characterizes the decision as choice within an owned situation with
owned outcomes. This is done to evoke the personally relevant nature of the outcomes in
a situated context. Participants will then exert control of the risk in their situation by
modifying the outcome set by selecting a pair of the outcomes to “keep”. This is done to
evoke a sense of manipulating an owned scenario. The pairs of outcomes that a decision
maker can select to keep are the same as the two possible alternatives that will be
presented in the risky choice task. This is done to make risks directly comparable across
the manipulation of personal ownership.
The risk modification task is meant to represent the procedural behavior of
selecting between alternatives exhibited during the risky choice task and other previous
instantiations of the gambling paradigm by asking participants to actively select one of
two possible probability/outcome pairs. However, the risk modification task also
encourages the interpretation of outcomes as endowed by asking decision makers to
change a single, personally-relevant situation. By establishing a personally-owned
situation, the risk modification task may provide participants with an additional reference
point with which to evaluate further choices. This would mean that risk preferences for
the risk modification task would be different from the risky choice task.
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Alternatively, when outcomes are owned, they are considered of a higher value
than when they are passively presented. As a result, people may act more conservatively
with outcomes that are given to them in a scenario rather than outcomes which are
passively presented to them as available choice options. Hence we might expect that to
the extent that personal ownership is responsible for the differences between the risky
choice and risk management task, people should take fewer risks in the risk modification
task.
The behavioral focus on improvement over selection. Not all risky decisions
require individuals to make selections from sets of alternatives. Different kinds of
decision environments may require people to manipulate risk and denote preferences in
different ways. One alternative approach denotes risky decision behavior as actions or
series’ of actions occurring within a complex environment (Klein, 2008). Naturalistic
decision making experiments often establish multiple goals or objectives for decision
makers to accomplish within a content domain (Todd & Gigerenzer, 2007; Gonzalez et
al., 2005; Keeney, 1988; 1996). Whereas the gambling paradigm involves a selection
from a set of alternatives, task environments from this alternative approach require
decision makers to improve their current situation through motivated action, as opposed
to passive selection (Klein, 2008). Actions taken as a result of these motivations are
purported to be a fundamentally different psychological process than deliberating
between choice alternatives (Vera & Simon, 1993; Adams, Tenney, & Pew, 1995).
Behavioral focus examines these task-induced motivations and their impact on risk
preferences.
So, if behavioral focus were to influence risk preferences, then tasks which
provide decisions as passive selection behavior would differ from tasks that require
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decision makers to improve their situation. There are several approaches to decision
making that demonstrate potential reasons why behavioral focus may influence risk
preferences. Each of these approaches will be discussed.
Adaptive decision making: heuristics and goal-directed behavior. The adaptive
toolbox approach (Todd & Gigerenzer, 2001) identifies a series of heuristics which
decision makers use to devise strategies for evaluating decisions. The presence of
environmental cues is posited to be the determining factor in the formation of these
heuristics for particular contexts. For example, people use satisficing strategies when
making decisions in environments where it is difficult to return to previous observed
experiences (Gigerenzer et al., 1996), whereas people use incremental or decremental
strategies when making decisions about where to search in environments with limited
resources (Todd & Gigerenzer, 2007).
Selection and improvement are two environmentally-determined decision
characteristics. It may be the case that improvement-focused and selection-focused
environments may constitute distinct environmental structures supposed by the adaptive
toolbox approach to activate different heuristics. This would explain the differences
between the risk management and risky choice tasks, as the decision strategy chosen for
the task with an improvement focus would be qualitatively different from the decision
strategy chosen for the task with a selection focus.
Naturalistic decision making and situation improvement. Task manipulations
from the naturalistic decision making tradition are often thought to be limited by the
difficulty in operationalizing theoretical constructs across different content domains
(Todd & Gigerenzer, 2007). However, the thread that seems to narrate the behavioral
aspects of these tasks is the goal to improve the current situation. Examples from
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naturalistic decision making have included fire-fighting (Brehmer, 1990; Brehmer &
Dorner, 1993), aviation (Simpson, 2001), criminal trials (Pennington & Hastie, 1988),
and medical diagnosis (Elstein et al., 1978). All of these content domains simulate a
deficient situation (i.e., forest fire, airplane malfunction, unresolved trial, or unknown
illness) that must be resolved via some intervention that ultimately makes an
improvement.
Situated action research uses task structures that start participants within a
complex environment and ask them to make a series of decisions to improve their
situation. The added benefits of the approach from Schneider (2003) over situated action
research is in type of behavior being measured; Schneider devised a way of constraining
responses while simultaneously keeping the environment situated and focused on
improvement, whereas situated action research employs free response and process tracing
methodologies to understand what strategies people exhibit in different content domains.
Selection tasks do not maintain an act of improvement to a situation found in
many real world contexts studied by naturalistic decision making. That is, a choice
between alternatives does not ask decision makers to initiate some action to improve an
ongoing active situation. Therefore selection tasks that examine risky decisions that are
missing some element of improvement may be limited in their generalizability to those
types of situations.
Dual process theory: two specific physiological mechanisms for making
decisions. Dual process (Stanovich & West, 2000) is a class of theories used to describe a
wide array of cognitive and neuropsychological findings. Dual process theory posits two
separate cognitive and/or physiological mechanisms operating during the decision
process; one is an intuitive feed-forward mental-modeling mechanism (system 1) while
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the other is deliberative mechanism that operates on decisions similarly as is presumed by
mainstream risky choice research in economics (system 2) (Loewenstein et al., 2008).
According to the theory, differential activation of these systems has been shown to yield
differences in risk preferences (Stanovich and West, 2000).
It may be the case that selection as a behavioral focus may engage the dual
process systems in a different way than when people are trying to make an improvement.
Improvement tasks maintain a salience of motivational goals which is posited to apply in
the context of the intuitive system (Evans, 2003). As a result, one might expect
improvement tasks to engage the intuitive system to manage this motivation. Selection
tasks, like the risky choice and risk modification task, would more appropriately be
evaluated more using the deliberative mechanism because they are focused on
differentiating economic alternatives, which is characteristic of system 2 processing
(Evans, 2003).
However, the specific task-relevant characteristics that activate one system over
another in dual process theory are still largely unknown. Because this study consists of
two different kinds of task environments, it is reasonable to believe that differential
activation of the dual systems may be a factor in the different behaviors found in the risky
choice and risk management tasks.
Manipulation of behavioral focus. For manipulating behavioral focus, we can
compare the already-devised risk modification task (from the previous section) to the
explicit consequence risk management task. The risk modification task incorporates a
choice focus while preserving the integrated display and endowed aspects of the risk
management task. The explicit consequences risk management task retains the same
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visible outcomes, but provides task instructions that describe the decision task as
improving an existing situation.
Naturalistic decision making has suggested that people can establish different
goals depending on the requirements of the decision environment (Keeney, 1988, 1996).
Different behavioral foci would then presumably lead to developing different strategies
for making decisions and thus different patterns of risk preferences. Also, Schneider
(2006) also addressed the motivational aspects of improving versus selecting good and
bad situations. A focus on improvement establishes a different motivation for what do to
about a situation that is already considered good or bad. Improvement focus may activate
motivational goals associated with making bad situations less hazardous and increasing
the potential of good situations. As a result, differences in risk preferences as a function
of valence are expected.
Summary and Hypotheses
The purpose of this dissertation is to explore four contextual elements that serve
to illustrate ways that real-world decision environments may differ from one another.
Similar to the technique used by Schneider and colleagues (2003, 2004, 2006), this study
is comprised of a set of systematic task variations meant to incorporate aspects of real
world contingencies while preserving tractability to allow comparisons with mainstream
findings that have come to dominate both economic and psychological theories of risky
decision making.
A summary table of the manipulations of situational context present in each task
is provided in figure 6. The structure of the task manipulations fit together such that the
classic risky choice task is incrementally transformed into the risk management task by
adding contextual elements piece by piece to each new task. The differences in risk
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preferences between these tasks will be investigated, progressing one-by-one through
manipulations of display integration, consequence salience, personal ownership, and
behavioral focus.
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Figure 6. Each task broken down by its component aspects of situational context.
For display integration, information about alternatives were provided in either
separate displays (one for each of two alternatives) or combined into a single display. We
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expected risk preferences for tasks with an integrated display to be different from the
original risky choice task because of the additional contrasts available when information
is integrated. In learning theory, information is suggested to be evaluated more easily for
integrated displays. Therefore, people may change their preference patterns when using
integrated displays because these task environments provide a simpler contrast between
the available options. Differential contrast may also lead to an overall tendency to take
fewer risks because integrated displays illustrate the shared characteristics of both
gambles, including the risks shared by both options.
For consequence salience, information about potential outcomes is provided
visually. We expect risk preferences for tasks with consequence information provided
visually to be different from the original risk management task because of the reliance on
information that can easily be extracted from a situation. Slovic (1972) suggests that
decision makers are more apt to use information that is available, rather than information
that must be intuited, calculated, and/or derived. As a result, the lack of consequences
provided in the risk management task, while applicable in many real world situations,
would change the pattern of risk preferences. The reliance on this information may also
lead to an overall tendency to task more risks because one of the consequences being
made salient is the largest possible value, which may increase the overall attractiveness of
the riskier gamble over the safer gamble.
For personal ownership, the decision maker makes a contrast between options
within a gamble that is given to them (and thus a part of their personal situation), rather
than making a contrast between choice options which are outside the immediate personal
involvement of the decision maker. We expect risk preferences for tasks with personallyowned situations to be different from the original risky choice task because of the impact
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of situated behavior on valuing outcomes in a decision environment. Research on
endowment has demonstrated that people valuate personally-owned outcomes differently
from non-owned outcomes (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). Valuing outcomes differently
for endowed gambles may change the way risks are calculated in different contexts,
resulting in different patterns of risk preferences for endowed and non-endowed decision
scenarios. It is unclear exactly how the valuation of personally owned outcomes might
influence the calculation of risk; however, endowed outcomes are suggested to have a
larger subjective value (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991). This suggests people may
be more attached to personally-owned situations and therefore less willing to take risks,
yielding an increase in risk aversion for gambles with personally owned outcomes.
For behavioral focus, the decision maker is asked to indicate their preference by
one of two processes; either via choosing between two possible alternative options or via
improving a single situation by increasing or decreasing risk. Different behavioral foci
may operate using separate motivational processes; choice involves a contrast between
separate and distinct options, whereas improvement involves making a situation better
through guided action.
Because behavioral foci may involve different motivational goals, risk preference
behavior may exhibit different patterns. For the vast majority of studies on risky choice,
the prevailing pattern of risk preferences is largely consistent with prospect theory
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), which suggests a pattern of risk seeking for losses and risk
aversion for gains. We expect to replicate this pattern.
In a risk management context, Schneider (2003) predicted that improving a good
or bad situation would yield a more intuitive pattern of risk preferences, wherein people
would be wary of taking risks when in a dangerous situation and would only be willing to
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consider risks when in a safe situation. This means we might expect risk aversion
throughout, and only occasional risk seeking behavior in the gain domain for
improvement-focused tasks.
To better characterize the influence of situational context on risk preferences, we
will include systematic manipulations of gamble characteristics, including valence and
variance. Previous investigations of valence suggest that people have different risk
preferences for gambles with positive outcomes and negative outcomes. More
specifically, prospect theory suggests that people more often exhibit risk-seeking
behavior for losses and risk-averse behavior for gains (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
However, further analyses with expanded sets of lotteries have demonstrated that lotteries
with a zero outcome are treated differently, and that patterns across positive and negative
are not as clear as previously thought (Hershey and Shoemaker, 1985). We expect to
replicate the pattern roughly consistent with prospect theory for the risky choice task, but
we predict that preferences will become farther and farther from that predicted pattern as
the context moves away from the standard gambling paradigm.
Variance serves to manipulate growing uncertainty in achieving an expectation.
Savage (1967) suggested that when given a choice between a gamble and a sure thing,
people will avoid the sure thing (and thus are willing to choose a risky option), but that
when people are given a choice between two gambles, they tend to choose the less risky
gamble. This can be illustrated by people’s willingness to buy lottery tickets (instead of
saving that money) coupled with their desire to make safer financial investments. We
predict that situations where sure-thing options are compared with gambles will result in
more risk seeking than situations where two gambles are being compared. There may also
be some task-related differences as a function of variance because some of the tasks
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elucidate the shared variance between gambles better than others. For example, when
gambles are integrated onto the same number line, the relationship between those
gambles is more readily apparent. The risky choice task does a poor job of illustrating
shared variance, and so differences as a function of variance between the risky choice
task and the other four integrated task manipulations is expected.
Because the body of research on risky choice research is already vast,
investigations of risky choice have commonly focused on the gambling paradigm.
Although alternative approaches to studying risky decision making behavior exist in the
field of naturalistic and adaptive decision making, they are not easily relatable to the
methodologies common in risky choice. In the present experiment, we try to bring these
two aims together by investigating differences in risk preferences due to commonly
ignored but potentially important aspects of situational context using systematic
variations of the gambling paradigm.
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Method
Participants
Two hundred and eighty seven undergraduate students participated in the
experiment in exchange for extra credit towards a psychology course. Experimental
sessions were conducted in groups of 4-12 participants. To ensure that respondents
adequately understood how to interpret the probabilistic stimuli, eighty participants were
excluded from the analysis for failing an eight-question quiz, leaving data from a total of
207 participants divided roughly evenly across five tasks. Participants who failed the quiz
were excluded because of potential biases or increased variability in risk preference
behavior resulting from a lack of complete understanding of the task rules. However, to
determine if these results generalize to a broader population, a robustness analysis is
provided to ensure that the general patterns of risk preferences for these participants did
not differ substantially from participants who passed the quiz.
Stimuli and Materials
Gamble Pairs. Stimuli consisted of 54 gamble pairs. The gambles within each
pair had the same expected value and each gamble consisted of two equiprobable
monetary outcomes. One of the two gambles was riskier because its outcomes were
(symmetrically) farther apart from the mean. The set of gamble pairs were structured
according to a factorial manipulation of valence (3), variance (3), and expected value (6).
Valence represents whether a gamble pair had all positive, all negative, or mixed
(some positive and some negative) outcomes. Instances of zero-valued outcomes also
appeared for some gambles in all valence conditions.
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Variance was manipulated by increasing the spread of the outcomes by a fixed
amount for both gambles in a pair. In the low variance condition, the lower risk option
was a sure-thing (100% probability; 0 spread) whereas the higher risk option had
outcomes that differed from the expectation by ±$50. In the moderate variance condition,
low risk option outcomes differed from expectation by ±$25 and high risk outcomes
differed from expectation by ±$75. In the higher variance condition, outcomes differed
from one another by deviations of ±$50 or ±$100.
Expected values were manipulated by six $25 increments for each valence.
Expected values varied between $75 and $200 for the positive valence, -$75 and -$200
for the negative valence, and between -$50 and $50 for the mixed valence (with dual
presentation of $0 expected value).
Task Manipulations. Five tasks were included in the study to systematically
manipulate differences in situational context. These are summarized in Table 1. Two of
the conditions were replications of the original risky choice and risk management
manipulations of Schneider (2003), while the other three were systematic manipulations
of these two tasks. The first two manipulations are largely perceptual: the display
integration manipulation compares an integrated display to the separated display of the
original risky choice task with all else equal; the consequence salience manipulation adds
explicit consequences to the original risk management task with all else equal. The final
variation is an amalgam of characteristics from both of the original tasks to serve as a
manipulation of personal ownership when compared to the integrated display variation of
the risky choice task and behavioral focus when compared to the consequence salience
variation of the risk management task.
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Original risky choice task. Following Schneider (2003), the risky choice task
elicited choice between pairs of two-outcome gambles. Each gamble was presented in a
separate display on the left and right of a single computer screen. The proposed
replication of the risky choice task was altered slightly to include similar visual cues
found in the updated computer version; in particular, each of the two gambles had
outcomes of a unique color (either light gray or dark gray). An example of this task is
presented in figure 7a.
Integrated risky choice task. This task is a variation of the original risky choice
task which presents a choice between two gambles in a single display instead of separate
displays. An example of this task is presented in figure 7b. Each gamble was represented
by a pairs of tickets in a single display with different colors for each gamble (one light
gray pair, one dark gray pair).

Figure 7. The image on the left (7a) portrays the original risky choice task, while the
image on the right (7b) portrays the integrated risky choice task. For the integrated risky
choice task, a gamble is still selected using radial buttons at the bottom, however, the
different gambles appear on the same number line and in the same display.
Original risk management task. Following Schneider (2003), the risk
management task elicits an improvement of one outcome from a single two-outcome
gamble scenario. An example of this task is presented in figure 8a. The two possible-
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resulting gambles after an improvement correspond to the two gambles presented in the
choice tasks.

Figure 8. The image on the left (8a) portrays the original risk management task, while the
image on the right (8b) portrays explicit-consequence risk management task. For the
explicit-consequence risk management task, information about the consequence of each
improvement is provided as a visual cue.
Explicit consequences risk management task. This task is a variation of the
original risk management task that provides visual cues about the consequences of each
improvement. The outcome that each ticket can be improved to yield was provided as a
ticket outlined with hyphens. An example of this task is shown in figure 8b.
Risk modification task. This is an intermediate task between the integrated risky
choice task and explicit consequence risk management task used to address two elements
of situational context simultaneously. Comparing the risk modification and integrated
risky choice tasks serves as a manipulation of personal ownership while comparing the
risk modification and explicit consequence risk management tasks serves as a
manipulation of behavioral focus. Two pairs of tickets (one light gray pair, one dark gray
pair) are combined into a single four-outcome gamble scenario. An example is shown in
figure 9. For each four-outcome gamble, risk preferences were elicited by selecting of
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one pairs of tickets to keep, while the other pair of tickets is removed. These two pairs of
tickets correspond to the gambles from the risky choice task and the two possible
gambles after an improvement in the risk management task.

Figure 9. Example from the risk modification task. Participants start with all four tickets
described as one gamble. By clicking on an outcome, the pair of outcomes of a similar
color would remain, while the outcomes of the alternate color would be removed from
the gamble. Electing to keep the pair of outcomes with less variance (shown in dark gray)
indicates risk aversion while electing to keep the pair of outcomes with greater variance
(shown in light gray) indicates risk seeking.
Design
The experimental design was a 5 x 3 x 3 mixed factorial design. Each participant
saw a series of 54 gamble pairs represented in one of the five possible tasks. As described
previously, three levels of valence and three levels of variance were manipulated within
the series of gamble pairs. The dependent variable was the chosen number of riskier
gambles out of five within each valence x variance condition.1 Four partially
counterbalanced orders were used for the series of 54 gamble pairs to control for potential
order effects. To control for the potential effects of time of day and task sequencing
1

Data were collected for 6 levels of expected value. However, one expected value was removed from the
positive and negative valences to remove instances of zero-valued outcomes, and one expected value was
removed from the mixed valence to remove the second (duplicate) presentation of the zero expected value
pair. Hence, the dependent variable for each condition is the number of riskier gambles selected out of a
possible 5 gambles systematically varying in expected values in increments of $25 for an overall range of
$100.
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effects, each of the five task conditions were run exactly once each day for ten days. The
task orders were determined using a pair of 5x5 Latin squares balanced to make sure each
task was preceded and followed by every other task exactly twice. These procedures were
done to balance for order and other nuisance variables in order to increase the likelihood
that the groups were equivalent. The colors of the tickets in the gambles for the original
risky choice, integrated risky choice, and risk modification tasks were also switched
halfway through the data collection process as a counterbalancing measure to control for
the possible influence of color perception/preference on behavior.
Procedure
Laboratory sessions lasted approximately 45 minutes and involved oral
instructions on how to complete the computerized task, the eight-question quiz to judge
an understanding of basic gamble characteristics, the series of 54 trials in one of four
orders, and four open-ended questions about individual’s strategies for making decisions.
The assigned task was explained during these instructions. As instructions were read to
the participants, four practice examples of gambles were completed by participants along
with the proctor. Participants then completed an eight-question quiz designed to test their
understanding of the basic distributional elements of gambles represented as tickets on a
number line [see attached quiz]. Participants were then presented with the series of 54
gamble pairs about which they made a decision. The risk preferences for each gamble
pair was recorded by the computer, along with the amount of time in seconds used to
evaluate the decision before making a choice. Finally, participants responded to four
open-ended questions about their strategy for making decisions.
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Empirical Results
The analysis explores the influence of display integration, consequence salience,
personal ownership, and behavioral focus on risky decision making behavior. First,
manipulation checks were conducted to verify that the control manipulations were
successful. Next, an overall analysis of task-related differences is provided. A set of subanalyses are then used to test the predictions of each aspect of situational context made
previously. These sub-analyses allow us to investigate the individual influence of each
contextual element on risk preferences, with particular emphasis on interactions between
situational context, valence, and variance.
Finally, an analysis of individual differences is used to further our understanding
of how different tasks may encourage different individuals to respond in different ways.
Each participant’s responses are compared to a variety of strategy predictions made using
various theoretical approaches to risky decision behavior. These individual analyses
allow us to see if different tasks encourage the selection of strategies consistent with one
or more of these predicted strategies.
Manipulation Checks
A series of manipulation checks were performed to verify that the control
manipulations were successful. First, ease of processing information in the task displays
was inferred by looking at the amount of time people used when evaluating a decision
across the five task manipulations. Next, participants’ likelihood to pass the quiz was
investigated to see if it was unduly influenced by the type of task being completed.
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Finally, an omnibus analysis was run including passing/failing the quiz as an independent
analysis to verify that there were no systematic differences in risk preferences due to an
incomplete understanding of the task requirements.
The amount of time necessary to evaluate a decision was investigated to infer
whether any of the task environments were easier to evaluate. If the integration of
information into a simpler display makes information easier to process, there should be
differences in the amount of time necessary to evaluate a decision. A decrease in the
amount of effort was expected for integrated displays, as predicted by cognitive load
theory (Chandler & Sweller, 1992).
A one-way ANOVA was performed to assess the average amount of time needed
to evaluate decisions as a function of the five tasks. There was a significant main effect of
task on decision time, F(4,202) = 236.61, p < .001. The main effect was clearly driven by
the differences between the original risky choice task, which had separate displays, (M =
8.8 seconds) and the other four tasks, which had integrated displays (with M ranging from
2.0 seconds to 2.3 seconds). This confirms our suspicions that integrated displays take
less time to evaluate than separate displays, and may therefore require less effort.
To ensure that there was no undue influence of task type on the participants’
ability to pass the quiz, the ratios of participants failing the quiz were compared across
the five tasks. To assess whether there were differential fail rates for different tasks, the
two tasks with the largest disparity in pass/fail percentage were compared using a 2 x 2
chi-square test of independence. The integrated risky choice task had the highest fail rate
(43 passing, 20 failing) while the risk modification task had the lowest fail rate (41
passing, 12 failing). The fail rates for these two tasks were not significantly different,
χ2(1, N = 116) = 1.19, p = .27. As these two tasks had the greatest disparity, and sample
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sizes were relatively consistent across tasks, all differences in fail rates were not
significant.
To assess whether participants who failed the quiz had different risk preference
behavior than participants who passed, a 5 x 2 x 3 x 3 Task x Quiz x Valence x Variance
Mixed ANOVA was performed. There was no significant main effect of passing/failing
the quiz, F < 1. None of the interactions were significant; all F’s < 1 (or all p’s > largest
test value).
Both quiz-related control manipulations indicated that there were no differences
in either ratio of participants who failed as a function of task, nor was there a strong
impact on risk preferences as a function of having failed the quiz. Nevertheless, to
remove any potential biases or noise due to inadequate knowledge of the task
requirements, participants who failed the quiz were excluded from all subsequent
analyses..
Overall Analysis of Task-related Differences
A 5 x 3 x 3 Task x Valence x Variance Mixed ANOVA was performed to assess
influences on risk preferences, operationalized as the number of riskier gambles selected
across five trials representing similar expected values.
As expected, there was a main effect of task, F(4,202) = 3.89, p < .01.
Participants in the original risky choice task (M = 2.43, SE = 1.67) took more risks
overall than participants in the original risk management task (M = 1.48, SE = 0.17) and
the other three tasks fell somewhere in-between. This is consistent with expectations and
the overall pattern observed in previous studies (Schneider, 2003).
There was also a main effect of valence, F(2,404) = 21.27 , p < .01, however it
may perhaps come as a surprise that risk preferences for gambles with positive outcomes
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(M = 2.18, SE = 0.11) were similar overall to risk preferences for gambles with negative
outcomes, (M = 2.10, SE = .07). In contrast, people were more risk averse overall for
mixed valence gambles (M = 1.56, SE = 0.11) than either positive or negative gambles,
which is likely responsible for this effect.
The main effect of variance was also significant, F(2,404) = 31.78, p < .01. As
expected, people took more risks in gamble pairs with a sure thing option (M = 2.21, SE
= 0.08) than gamble pairs where both options had less predictable outcomes (M = 1.84,
SE = 0.08 & M = 1.79 SE = 0.08 respectively).
As expected, there was a significant interaction of valence and task type, F(8,404)
= 7.71, p < .01, the results of which are displayed in figure 10. First, the pattern of
preferences for the original risky choice task is roughly consistent with the predictions of
prospect theory. When investigating the simple effect of valence for the risky choice task,
participants are significantly more risk seeking for negative valence gambles than for
positive and mixed valence gambles, F(2,42) = 13.78, p < .01. Additionally, the pattern
of preferences for the original risk management task is consistent with prior evidence.
When investigating the simple effect of valence for the risk management task,
participants are significantly more risk seeking for positive valence gambles than for
negative and mixed valence gambles, F(2,39) = 6.38, p < .01.
The simple effects of valence for the three intermediate task manipulations
maintain one of these two possible patterns. The integrated risky choice and risk
modification tasks share a similar pattern across valence as the original risky choice task;
F(2,42) = 8.92, p < .01 and F(2,40) = 13.26, p < .01 respectively. The explicit
consequence risk management task shares a similar pattern across valence as the original
risk management task, F(2,39) = 20.42, p < .01.
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Figure 10. Risk preferences as a function of Task Type x Valence. Error bars are
standard error.
There was a significant interaction of variance and task type, F(8,404) = 2.98, p <
.01. The graph in figure 11 demonstrates that the previously discussed pattern of risk
seeking for low variance gambles and risk aversion for moderate and higher variance
gambles is more prominent for the original risk management task, with the other four
tasks showing very little change in behavior as a function of variance.
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Figure 11. Risk Preferences as a Function of Task Type x Variance. Error bars are
standard error.
There was also a significant interaction of valence and variance, F(4,808) = 11.92,
p < .01. Participants tended to be more risk seeking for low variance gambles and more
risk averse for moderate and higher variance gambles, but this pattern is more
pronounced for negative and mixed valence gambles than for positive valence gambles.
The pattern was especially pronounced for the original risk management condition.
Additionally, the three-way Valence x Variance x Task interaction was
significant, F(16,808) = 1.8, p < .05. In the low variance conditions, the pattern of risk
preferences for the original and explicit consequences risk management tasks are more
risk seeking than the other three tasks for the positive valence but more risk averse for the
negative and mixed valence conditions. However, in the moderate and higher variance
conditions, only the explicit consequence risk management task is more risk seeking than
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the other (now four) tasks for the positive valence gambles. This suggests that some of
the differences in valence normally found in the risk management task occur primarily
for lower variance gambles, while the presence of consequence information enhances risk
seeking for positive valence gambles throughout. The three choice tasks (original risky
choice, integrated risky choice, and risk modification) all have relatively stable patterns
of risk preferences across valences and variances.
Separate Analyses of Contextual Differences
To measure the influence of individual contextual manipulations, effect coding
was used to conduct follow-up regression analyses. The relationship between tasks and
their corresponding effect code is available in figure 6. Even though these individual
analyses are admittedly additional tests and are a non-orthogonal set of planned
comparisons, we did not adjust familywise alpha as this work is exploratory. Although
there is a higher likelihood of making one or more type 1 errors, we were more concerned
that we not miss potential effects. Nevertheless, this decision reinforces the need to
demonstrate the reliability of our findings through replication.
Display Integration. The difference in the pattern of risk preferences from the
original risky choice task and the other four tasks in combination served to demonstrate
the size and direction of the influence of integrating the displays. Results from the effectcoded analysis for display integration showed a main effect, F(1,202) = 4.43, p = .04. As
was expected, participants were more risk seeking for the original risky choice task (M =
2.2), where options were presented in separate displays, than the combination of the other
four tasks (M = 1.71), which all used integrated displays. No other interactions with
display integration approached significance.
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These results suggest that risk preferences are influenced by the type of contrast
provided in a decision. Combined with the manipulation check looking at decision times,
these results suggest that simpler contrasts between choice alternatives are easier to
process and may yield an overall increase in risk aversion. .
Consequence salience. The difference in the pattern of risk preferences between
the original risk management task and the other four tasks served to demonstrate the
influence of providing consequence information visually. Results from the effect-coded
analysis for consequence salience showed a main effect, F(1, 202) = 4.23, p = .04. As
expected, we found an overall tendency to take more risks when consequence
information is visually provided (M = 2.21 across four tasks) compared to the original
risk management task (M = 1.7).
There was also a significant interaction of consequence salience and variance,
F(1.76, 256.07) = 5.39, p = .0072. This interaction can be observed in figure 11 above.
Participants in the original risk management task were more risk averse for moderate and
higher variance gambles, whereas the other four tasks did not have noticeably different
risk preferences as a function of variance. No other interactions that included
consequence salience were significant.
These results suggest that risk preferences are influenced by the presence of visual
cues that convey explicit consequence information. The presence of these visual cues
seems to increase the overall tendency to take risks. This may be due to an increase in the
attractiveness of the riskier gamble now that the best possible outcome is visible (and
always belongs to the riskier gamble).

2

Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used to account for potential heterogeneity of variance given a
significant Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity.
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Personal Ownership. Personal ownership serves to differentiate tasks with two
potential gambles not belonging to the decision maker from tasks with a single gamble
that is described as being owned by the decision maker. The risk modification, explicit
consequence risk management, and original risk management tasks all fall under the
single owned gamble case, while the original and integrated risky choice tasks both fall
under the two gamble choice case.
We expected to see different patterns of risk preferences for tasks with a single
owned gamble versus tasks with two non-owned gambles. Results from the effect-coded
analysis for personal ownership did not show a main effect on risk preferences, F(1, 202)
= 0.009, p = .925. Additionally, no interactions involving personal ownership approached
significance (all p > 0.7). These results suggest the manipulation of personal ownership
did not affect risk preferences.
Behavioral Focus. Behavioral focus serves to differentiate tasks which require a
choice between options from tasks which require an improvement of a given situation.
The risk modification, original risky choice, and integrated risky choice tasks are all
choice-focused, while the original and explicit consequence risk management tasks are
both improvement-focused.
Different patterns of risk preferences were expected for the different behavioral
foci. Specifically, choice-focused tasks were expected to look similar to the predictions of
prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), while improvement-focused tasks were
expected to yield a predominance of risk aversion, with a tendency to take more risks
only when gambles are positive. Results from the effect-coded analysis for behavioral
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focus showed no main effect, F(1, 202) = .104, p = .75. However, there was a significant
interaction of behavioral focus and valence, F(1.61, 325.72) = 14.37, p < .001.
The pattern of results is shown in figure 12. The pattern of risk preferences for
choice-focused tasks conforms roughly to the predictions of Prospect Theory (Kahneman
& Tversky, 1979), namely an increased tendency towards risk seeking for negative
valence gambles and risk aversion for positive valence gambles. However, the patterns of
risk preference for improvement-focused tasks are the opposite, with risk aversion for the
negative valence and a tendency toward risk seeking for the positive valence. Notice that
risk seeking tendencies are weak at best across all conditions. Preferences for mixed
lotteries are nearly identical for the two behavioral foci.
5

Choice‐Focus (n = 127)

Average number of Risks Taken (out of 5)

Improvement‐Focus (n = 80)
4

3

2

1

0
Negative

Mixed

Positive

Valence of Lottery Outcomes

Figure 12. Risk Preferences as a Function of Behavioral Focus and Valence. Error bars
are standard error.
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In sum, the sub-analyses suggest that (a) display integration reduces risk taking
and, as observed previously, also reduces the amount of time used to evaluate options; (b)
consequence salience increases risk taking on its own and interacts with variance; (c)
personal ownership does not seem to influence risk preferences at all; and (d) behavioral
focus influences the overall pattern of risk preferences as a function of valence.
Individual Differences Analyses
The purpose of the individual differences analysis is to understand human
behavior at the level of the decision maker, not simply looking for patterns across
averages. So, to better understand each individual’s behavior, we compared individual
responses with the predictions from a number of generally recognized ‘strategies’ that
participants might use to form their preferences. If there are different strategies being
selected for different tasks, then the contextual elements that separate those tasks are
presumably contributing to strategy selection. First we will outline the strategies we used
to predict individual behavior. Then we will show the predictive capacity of these
strategies within each task.
Types of Strategies. Three commonly recognized strategies were the focus of this
analysis. Two first two strategies result from a contrast in predictions as a function of
valence. The prospect theory strategy predicts behavior according to the prospect theory
value function, whereby decision makers are risk seeking for negative valence gambles
and risk averse for positive and mixed valence gambles (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
The risk-as-threat strategy predicts a pattern generally consistent with the
security/potential component of SP/A theory (Lopes & Oden, 1999), whereby people
avoid risks when facing negative or threatening situations, but become more apt to take
risks in situations as they move into safer territory and can garner more positive
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opportunities. For the risk-as-threat strategy, zero outcomes are treated as a contrasting
value, so that zero seems positive when among only negative outcomes and is treated as
negative when among only positive outcomes.
Finally, one strategy is sensitive to the variance in gamble pairs. The modest
variance strategy predicts that individuals will be more apt to take risks when facing a
low variance gamble and avoid risks when facing a moderate or higher variance gamble.
This pattern is consistent with the predictions made by Savage (1967) and our overall
analysis.
Strategy Prediction Analysis. Binomial z was used to identify risk preference
strategies that best predicted individual behavior on significantly more than half of the 54
trials. Strategies needed to predict at least 35 trials to be considered predictive of actual
behavior, otherwise no strategy was indicated. If more than one strategy reached this
threshold, the one that could account for the most selections was deemed the best
predictor. The number of people best predicted by each strategy for each task is provided
in Figure 13.

Figure 13. Number of participants best predicted by each of three strategies for each task.
The strategy prediction results coincide with the omnibus analysis and
demonstrate that behavioral focus has the prevailing influence over which strategy is
selected. For the original risky choice, integrated risky choice, risk modification tasks,
more people are behaving in a manner consistent with the prospect theory strategy or a
basic risk strategy. For the original and explicit consequence risk management tasks,
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more people are behaving in a manner consistent with the risk-as-threat strategy.
Additionally, the differences between the original and explicit consequence risk
management tasks are an increased prevalence of the modest variance strategy in the
original risk management task. Also, the lack of non-significant predictions for the
original risk management task may be due to the prevalence of modest variance
strategies. The absence of consequence salience may encourage people to use a strategy
that operates using variance.
Summary of Results
The primary findings is that behavioral focus has the strongest impact on risk
preferences; choice-focused tasks are more risk seeking for negative gambles than
positive gambles while improvement focused tasks are more risk seeking for positive
gambles than negative gambles. The effects of behavioral focus were also confirmed
through individual strategy prediction. There were also effects of display integration and
consequence salience on risk preferences, whereby preferences shifted to be more risk
averse in conditions where participants were (a) given an integrated display and (b) not
given explicit consequence information, especially for moderate and higher variance
gambles.
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Discussion
The goal of this dissertation was to understand how several elements of situational
context might influence risky decision making behavior. This evolved from the
motivation to understand what aspects of a situation might be responsible for the
differences in risk preferences between the risky choice and risk management tasks from
Schneider (2003). Four distinct elements of situational context were identified and
manipulated using the gambling paradigm.
Figure 14 summarizes the Task x Valence relationship between these four
contextual aspects. Behavioral focus had the greatest influence on risk preferences. For
choice-focused tasks, risk preferences were consistent with the prospect theory value
function (risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses). For improvement-focused
tasks, risk preferences were consistent with the risk-as-threat pattern (risk seeking for
gains and risk aversion for losses).
Both display integration and consequence salience were also responsible for
preference differences between the risky choice and risk management task. When
gambles are combined in an integrating display, people on average take fewer risks. In
contrast, when consequence information is more salient, people tend to take more risks.
Personal ownership did not seem to have any effect on risk preferences.
We have identified 3 potentially important influences on risky decision making
behavior using features of decisions not well represented by the classic gambling
paradigm. By incorporating systematic variations in the gambling paradigm, these results
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take us beyond the standard paradigm while at the same time providing a means to relate
our findings directly to existing research in risky choice. To communicate how these
results fit into existing theory, a brief summary of the implications of results for each
element of situational context will be provided, followed by an analysis of the predictive
capacity of models such as cumulative prospect theory and security potential/aspiration
(SP/A) theory. Finally, the future directions of this approach to studying risky decisions
using situational context will be discussed.

Figure 14. Task x Valence results and the effects of elements of situational context on
willingness to take risks.
Behavioral Focus and Current versus Future States
A pattern of results consistent with the prospect theory value function was
confirmed for selection tasks up to and including risk modification, but the opposite
pattern with respect to positive and negative outcomes was found for improvement-
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focused tasks. The gambling paradigm represents all decisions as choices, and as was
pointed out in the introduction, there are other domains where decisions may be better
represented as an improvement of a situation (Gigerenzer, 2007; Gonzalez et al., 2005;
Keeney, 1988; 1996).
Because there has been little crossover between these two behavioral foci, the
field of decision making currently lacks an established interpretation of why decisions
represented as choices differ from decisions represented as improvements. One possible
explanation is that improvement environments provide a single, simple assessment of
what to expect, whereas choice environments require more information to be combined
before a total assessment of the situation can be made. The influence of expectations
about a decision on behavior has been referred to as aspirations (Siegel, 1955; Payne et
al., 1980), The risk-as-threat strategy presents an interpretation of what might happen
when evaluating a decision using aspirations; when people perceive themselves to be in a
threatening or negative space, they avoid adding additional risk, whereas when people
perceive themselves to be in a positive or potentially lucrative space, may add risk to
maximize their potential gains. This would not occur in the risky choice task because
there is no easy way to discern how the available choice alternatives relate to one another.
A more easily discernible assessment of one’s situation for improvement-focused tasks
might strengthen the influence of aspirations on risky decision behavior, thus making risk
preferences appear similar to the risk-as-threat strategy.
An alternative interpretation of the differences between improvement and choice
situations is that the act of making an improvement instantiates a positive trajectory of the
situation necessarily getting better, whereas choice situations contain no such trajectory
or information about past states. People in the improvement task may get the sense that
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they are moving through time in a decision, whereas the choice task has no such
information about the past and so no sense of a timeline exists. This is akin to moving
forward along a simple one-directional Markov decision process (Markov, 1971), where
improvement-focused tasks provide additional information about the previous state of a
decision that choice-focused tasks do not provide. It is not yet clear exactly how this
trajectory might then influence risk preferences; trajectories could potentially change how
people value outcomes, what kinds of goals or aspirations people set, etc.
Consequence Salience and Inferences
Exact visual representations of consequences are common in the gambling
paradigm. However, in many instances people may lack explicit information about the
consequences of their intended behavior. Instead, people make and use predictions or
inferences about future consequences. The risk management task provides a consistent
rule for how to infer the value of future consequences without providing exact visual
information. Because we found decreased risk seeking behavior for implicit presentations
of consequence information, decision processes must somehow be affected by gaining
consequence information explicitly.
The gambling paradigm nearly always provides complete information, so there is
little research which can specifically address the effects of consequence salience. One
possible interpretation is that when exact information is present, people may maintain
more confidence in their decisions. Confidence has been shown to correlate with
increased risk taking behavior (Darke & Freedman, 1997). Increased risk taking for
explicit consequence information suggests that the gambling paradigm might be
overestimating the amount of risk taking behavior that occurs in risky decision making
more generally.

CHOICE MANAGEMENT AND MODIFICATION

59

Display Integration and an Effort-versus-Preference Distinction
There are two distinguishing characteristics of display integration; (a) slightly
more risk seeking for separated than integrated displays and (b) substantially more time
required to make a decision for separated than integrated displays. Taken together, these
results suggest that while information in the integrated display is easier to understand and
process, risk preferences are only mildly affected by the added benefits that come from
the greater ease of processing.
Slightly more risk seeking for separated displays than integrated displays
demonstrates a potential effect of format presentation on risk preferences. As
hypothesized earlier, it may be that separated displays encourage an alternative-based
strategy and tasks with integrated displays encourage an attribute-based strategy. The
results suggest a need to further explore whether attribute-based representations are more
likely in situations similar to risk management, and whether attribute-based
representations encourage more risk averse tendencies.
As a dependent variable, time was intended as a rough estimate of evaluative
effort. Our results cast doubt on claims that differences in effort should have
corresponding differences in risk preferences because we found a large difference in
processing time with small differences in risk preferences, as well as small differences in
processing time with large differences in risk preferences. Time differences may persist
when information can be evaluated more easily, but it is unclear precisely why the ease of
information processing would translate into risk preferences.
In the literature, a popular approach to understanding effort versus risk preference
relationships is a class of theories that suggest risky decision behavior uses two
differentially-effortful processes, commonly referred to as dual process theory (e.g.,
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Slovic et al., 2004; Stanovich and West, 2000). Dual process theories describe two
systems used to guide behavior. The two processes are the slow and effortful deliberative
system and the fast and automatic intuitive system.
Our results may present a problem for dual process theory, as we observed large
time differences with relatively small risk preference differences as well as small time
differences with relatively large risk preference differences. It is not clear how a dual
process theory approach might reconcile this result. Speculatively, the decreased time
necessary to analyze the information in an integrated display may suggest that relying
more heavily on intuitive processing could decrease the tendency to take risks.
Personal Ownership
The manipulation of personal ownership was intended to represent situations in
which someone is given something before making a decision about it. The strength and
prevalence of endowment effects made personal ownership a likely candidate to
differentiate the original risky choice and risk management tasks, because gambles were
owned in the original risk management task and were not owned in the original risky
choice task. However, there were no observed differences in risk preferences as a
function of providing a situation with a personally-owned gamble. While research on the
endowment effect has suggested that endowment may increase risk aversion
(Kachelmeier & Shehata, 1992), we did not find evidence of this.
One possibility is that our manipulation of personal ownership may not have been
sufficiently salient. There are multiple characteristics of an endowment effect
manipulation, of which personal ownership is only one. Other elements from endowment
manipulations that might increase the likelihood of observing an effect include the
motivation to sell rather than to buy (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990), physical
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objects being exchanged rather than an abstract representation of monetary information
(Thaler, 1980), and single objects or outcomes being evaluated rather than multiple,
usually risky objects in a selection task.
Capacity of Existing Model Predictions
As discussed in the introduction, one benefit of using the gambling paradigm is its
relationship to existing models of risky choice. This section will provide an analysis of
the predictive capacity of popular models to account for the results of our contextual
manipulations. The analysis will focus on the model structures of cumulative prospect
theory (CPT) and security/potential aspiration (SP/A) theory.
Cumulative Prospect Theory Model. Cumulative Prospect theory (CPT)
incorporates three psychological components into the value function of a descriptive
theory of decision making: marginally decreasing sensitivity, reference points, and loss
aversion (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). These three psychological phenomena are
reflected in how model parameters are incorporated and bounded into an otherwise
simple formal model. In combination with a probability weighting function, the CPT
model aims to provide a descriptive account of risky decision behavior.
The following are the formulas which constitute the CPT model:
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WV(X) is the weighted value of gamble X which is determined by combining
evaluations of each of the possible gamble outcomes and their associated probabilities,
V(xi) is the subjective value for outcome xi, π(pi) is the (cognitively) weighted probability
of pi. The parameters represented here are: (a) alpha (α), which is the weight applied to
positive or zero outcomes (xi ≥ 0); (b) beta (β), which is the weight applied to negative
outcomes; (c) lambda ( ), which represents the extent to which losses are weighted more
heavily than gains; and (d) gamma and delta (γ & δ), which are probability weights for
positive/zero and negative values respectively.3
Additionally, parameters are bounded; that is, prospect theory stipulates the range
of possible values for each parameter in the prospect theory model. In the CPT model
0 < α < 1, 0 < β < 1, and

>1

By bounding alpha and beta between zero and one, the value function is concave for
positive values of X and convex for negative values. As the values get further from the
reference point, the difference in values is weighted as less. For example, the difference
between $400 and $420 is weighted as less than the difference between $20 and $40
because
|420.5 – 400.5| < |40.5 – 20.5|
Bounding lambda to always be greater than 1 means losses will always be more heavily
weighted than equivalent gains (loss aversion). For example, the difference between gain
$10 or $20 is weighted as less than the difference between losing $10 or $20 because
|20.5 – 10.5| < | - *20.5 – (- *10.5)| if

3

>1

Since we were using equal probabilities for outcomes in both gambles, the probability parameters are
extraneous. For our case, this also means that the predictions of CPT are equivalent to those of the original
formulation of prospect theory.
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Because parameters are bounded, prospect theory will always predict risk aversion for
gains. Where V(xi) > 0, the smaller the difference in the values of xi, the greater the value
WV(X) will be given equal expected values. For example, imagine a choice between
gamble R, a 50/50 chance of $1 or $3, or gamble S, a sure thing of $2.
WV R

1. ∗ .5
WV

3. ∗ .5

.5

2. ∗ 1

1.73 ∗ .5

1.365

1.41

WV(S) > WV(R) while |Vs(X1) – Vs(X2)| > |Vr(X1) – Vr(X2)|
Risk seeking is predicted for negative gambles because
WV(R) > WV(S)
while [- |Xr1|β – (- |Xr2|β)] > [- |Xs1|β – (- |Xs2|β)]
and all xi > 0
Also, as α and/or β  1, WV(A) ≈ WV(B) leading to a weaker prediction of risk
preference behavior until the decision maker becomes indifferent between choosing the
more versus less risky option when α = β = 1.
To demonstrate how well CPT model can predict our empirical results, the region
of possible predictions is provided in figure 15 along with the average risk preferences at
each expected value for the five tasks from the current investigation. The regions of
possible prediction for the CPT model are provided as the shaded area.
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Figure 15. Average risk preferences at each expected value with added region of possible
prediction for CPT. Due to loss aversion, predictions are risk averse at the $0 expected
value.
The original risky choice task barely fit within the regions of prediction for the
CPT model, meaning the parameters of the CPT model could be adjusted to account for
its results. However, the remaining four tasks fall outside the possibility of being
predicted by the CPT model for several expected values, especially in the negative
domain. There is no way the parameters of the CPT model can be adjusted to fit these
data. In addition, the CPT model is incapable of predicting risk seeking for increasingly
large positive expected values in the explicit consequence risk management task.
The limitations on how CPT model parameters can be defined are what establish
the above regions of prediction. In summary, predictions from the prospect theory model
are rigid in their interpretation of decision making because the value function has been
defined as necessarily S-shaped. While the parameters used to establish the value
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function represent relevant psychological phenomena, the manipulations of situational
context transform preference patterns in ways that the CPT model cannot predict.
SP/A theory model. Security Potential/Aspiration (SP/A) theory was developed
as an alternative to explain risky decision behavior using a dispositional motivation and
goal-oriented perspective. The security-potential (SP) tradeoff in SP/A theory applies
approach/avoidance motivations to deal with risky situations; people’s feelings about risk
lie on a spectrum from seeking security and avoiding risks to seeking potential and taking
risks. The aspiration (A) in SP/A theory represents a potential threshold for what a
participant expects out of a current situation that causes people to exhibit behavior that
can satisfy this threshold. These two components can generate preferences which are
sometimes in concert but sometimes conflict.
Whereas CPT must predict different risk preferences for gains and losses, SP/A
theory allows for asymmetric predictions in value functions for gains and losses.
Specifically, SP/A theory was devised in part to account for observed behavior that is
largely consistent with our findings; strongly risk averse for gains, but varied for losses
(Lopes & Oden, 1999). SP/A accounts for this pattern by suggesting that most people (a)
are security-minded, (b) set modest aspirations for positive gambles, and (c) set high
aspiration levels for negative gambles, thereby leading to conflict for negative gambles
(Lopes, 1995).Additionally, SP/A theory makes individual level predictions to allow for
flexibility when observing domain specific risky decision behavior.
Given this added predictive capacity, the SP/A theory model could feasibly
describe all of the risk preference patterns exhibited across the manipulated aspects of
situational context. However, the general approach of SP/A theory was as a model of
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individual behavior, with flexibility to increase the number of parameters given
additional complexity in the specific content domain (Lopes & Oden, 1999).
It would be unwise to use the formal SP/A theory model to make specific
predictions about our data because parameters in the SP/A theory model are designed to
capture individual differences. The strategy-prediction analysis confirms that there were
individual differences both within and across situational contexts. A within-subject
design would be necessary to distinguish between (a) changes in SP/A theory model
parameters to best fit each situational context and (b) the predictive capacity of SP/A
theory model parameters to account for individual differences across situational contexts.
While the CPT model cannot predict our context manipulation results that deviate
from the risky choice task, the SP/A theory model can predict some aspects of situational
context, but only in-so-far as each aspect of context influences how people form
aspirations. Because we have found 3 different situational context variables that each
influence risk taking in different ways, it may be premature to think that context effects
can currently be incorporated into formal models at this point. Additional studies similar
this one may be helpful in identifying a small set of situational context variables that
exert a predictable influence on risk preferences.
Conclusions and Future Directions
Model Predictions. Overall, the popular formal models we considered lack the
capacity to account for elements of situational context. Both models lack a means to
directly address how systematically manipulated situational context might influence risk
preferences. There are, however, viable alternatives to using a formal model. The
adaptive toolbox approach can provide a descriptive account for the influence of aspects
of situational context. This approach suggests that people uses available cues from their
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decision environment to build a heuristic to navigate decisions in similar environments. It
is unclear whether this approach can be modified into a predictive model of risk
preferences, given its reliance on adaptive constructs like learning and experience (Todd
& Gigerenzer, 2001).
Alternatively, a computational model of decision making like decision field
theory (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993) gives a greater level of detail at predicting and
modeling individual responses by introducing psychophysiological techniques like eyetracking and neuroimaging to the prediction of decision behavior. However, these models
are generally considered by many to be too complex (Busemeyer & Johnson, 2008),
focus on aspects of context which are too narrow, too often focus on specific domains
(Brehmer, 1992), and are again intended for primarily descriptive purposes. However, by
identifying elements of context shared across domains and injecting them into the
gambling paradigm, we have identified perceptual and cognitive constructs that could be
included into a computational model or otherwise process-level explanation of risk
preferences across domains. The primary challenge is one of parsimony in capturing
those aspects of situational context that provide the clearest and most reliable effects on
risk preferences.
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Alternative Explanations of Behavioral Focus. Behavioral focus is a complex
construct which maintains multiple possible interpretations. One the one hand, choices
are comparative between alternatives that cannot be altered, whereas improvements are
made to situations which can be altered by the decision maker. This may well instantiate
a feeling of perceived personal control over decisions in improvement-focused tasks not
present in choice-focused tasks. Alternatively, choices are made between two possible
scenarios which will happen sometime in the future, whereas improvement situations are
made about a current situation that must be fixed or improved in the present. Finally,
choices in this experiment involve picking between two innocuous situations, whereas
improvement-focus task necessary takes a bad situation and makes it better. The
implications of each of these possible interpretations will be discussed in turn.
Perceived Control. Some might argue that choice-focused and improvementfocused task environments engender a differential sense of personal responsibility over
the scenario (Klein, 1989). In the original and integrated risky choice tasks, people were
asked to observe and select one of two isolated alternatives with no say in how those
alternatives will look. In the improvement-focused tasks, people were given an
opportunity to change an existing gamble in a manner of their choosing. However, the
risk modification task, which represented a choice as the alteration of a situated gamble,
presumably shared a similar sense of control over a given situation. The risk modification
task showed no noticeable differences in risk preferences compared to the standard
choice task. As a result, it is difficult to make the claim that behavioral focus occurred
entirely due to a different sense of control over the situation or its outcomes.
Knowledge about Current and Future Situations. Decisions made along a
timeline, whether they are from experience (Erev et al., 2010), under time pressure
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(Svenson, 1993; Ordonez & Benson, 1997), or occurring with feedback in an adaptive
environment (Brehmer, 1992; Jessup, Bishara, & Busemeyer, 2008) are of particular
interest due to their practical applications. Our reality is bounded by time. Even so,
‘information about the future’ and ‘information from the past’ have not been given equal
treatment in the study of risky decision making. Economics has almost exclusively
concerned itself with understanding risky decision making from the point of view of
future states to formulate predictions about behavior. Economic models are then built as
additive linear calculations to compress any and all information from a decision into
future prospects to be compared or judged.
Behavioral focus may influence risk preferences because of the differential focus
on present vs. future states. All three choice-focused tasks provide information about
future states as separate entities; separate gamble displays in the original risky choice
task, and separate pairs of gamble outcomes in the integrated risky choice and risk
modification tasks. Both improvement focused tasks provide information about the
current state, and only provide tacit information about the future; dotted lines with arrows
in the explicit consequence risk management task and as a task rule in the original risk
management task. Motivationally, you might expect differences in risk preferences given
a person’s association of what they are currently looking at into what they might expect
to happen in the future.
The Effect of Making a Situation Better. It may also be that the improvement
focus anchors participants to a not-as-good situation before eliciting any action. When
providing a situation that requires improvement, the decision maker is exposed to an
anchor that might influence the evaluation of possible future actions. For improvementfocus tasks, this anchor was always worse than both of the possible future states. To
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determine whether the direction of the anchor (going from bad to good) was at least
partially responsible for the effects of behavioral focus, a future investigation might
provide participants with a superior situation that would need to be made worse (going
from good to bad). Mitigating a situation that will become worse via curtailing outcome
values would constitute an unexplored behavioral focus; one focused on the mitigation of
an impending negative change in the situation.
Further Systematic Manipulations of Context. It should be clear that not all
decisions are choices, and not all choices are the same. Additional characteristics of
context from naturalistic decision making and other sources of field research should be
included into research in risky decision making. It will be especially valuable if critical
real-world variables can be extracted and mapped onto tasks that can be studied in
controlled settings. The gambling paradigm only captures a limited set of contextual
elements from decisions in the real world; choices between pre-existing alternatives with
explicit consequences. Research in risky decision making is missing out on capturing a
great deal of context necessary to understand what people are doing when decisions
aren’t represented as choices between well-defined alternatives.
It is one thing to say that not all gamble are choices, but yet another to identify the
specific ways in which other kinds of decisions differ from choices. By systematically
adding context from naturalistic decision making, and other realms of psychology like
learning, into systematic manipulations of highly controlled paradigms, it may be
possible to directly observe the effects on preference from many different elements of
context. This has wide ranging potentially transformative implications for risky decision
research, which historically has been limited to only using a handful of tasks to study risk
preferences.
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By using several cognitive process-level explanations as the basis for developing
intermediate task conditions, a researcher can determine if effects are due to a perceptual
characteristic of stimuli, a motivational component of human behavior, etc. Further
experimentation using similar paradigmatic manipulations of context are necessary to
understand the impact of real-world context that are not adequately represented by the
gambling paradigm.
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Appendix
Eight Question Quiz

1. Do you have a better chance of drawing a ticket worth $50 or $100?
2. If you were to draw randomly from this lottery over and over, what ticket value would
you be expected to draw an average of only 3 out of every 20 times?
3. If you were given the chance to randomly draw a ticket from this lottery, which value
would you be least likely to draw?
4. In this lottery, do you have a better chance of drawing a positive ticket, a zero, or a
negative ticket?

5. Of the values in this lottery with at least one ticket,
what value is the least likely outcome?
6. In a single draw from this lottery, do you have a better chance of drawing a
$0 ticket or a $100 ticket?
7. What is the best value that you can draw from this lottery?
8. How many tickets result in you not losing money?
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